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l. The  Philosophical  Relevance  of  Art 
In this piece of work we seek to present Adorno’s aesthetic theory like an 
appropriate proposal to specify the nature and the current philosophical status of aesthetics, 
beyond the aesthetic approaches of Hegel and of -recognizing the impropriety of the use of 
the term ‘aesthetics’- Heidegger, although in fact recognizing that Adorno’s aesthetic 
conception is precisely beginning to take definite shape in the debate with them, especially 
with the Hegelian position. Nevertheless, Adorno’s ae thetic theory joins in principle with 
the fundamental thesis of Hegel and of Heidegger in the sense of affirming the 
philosophical/epistemological and ontological relevance of art, opposite to the other 
perspective that has largely configured the modern understanding of the aesthetics, the one 
that starting from Kant and that passing to Kierkegaard, culminates in the Positivism. The 
compartmentalization of Kant about knowledge finally granted the rights of the knowledge 
and the truth to the science exclusively, affirming that the aesthetic judgement -the art – 
does not contribute any knowledge about their objects1. Art would rather have to do with 
the feeling of life. In any case, evicting it of the knowledge, Kant inaugurated the 
understanding of art like game, gratuitous and disinterested activity, understanding that 
culminated in the positivism of Spencer and Taine, where art –already constituted in mere 
vital tonic, irrational matter left to the wild arbitrariness of the fantasy- becomes pure 
game, nothing serious, secondary activity opposite to science, that is configured as the only 
truly serious activity for having in property the rights of the knowledge.  For this reason it 
is not strange that the modern thought has mainly put to bed the philosophy on the side of 
the science (Descartes, Kant or Husserl), nor that when the inadequacy of the 
scientific/rational thought has been recognized philosophy had come closer to religion 
(Kierkegaard) than to art2. 
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Hegel and Heidegger -saving the enormous differences between one and other - 
reacted against this positivist understanding of art. Hegel affirms that art is worthy of 
scientific/philosophical treatment and, if it is so, it is due to that is not neither simple vital 
tonic, nor an arbitrary game without rules3; the art is not the field of irrationality but rather, 
together with religion and philosophy, they are “ways of expressing and of making 
conscious the divine thing, the most universal truth in the human spirit”4. They are 
manifestations of the spirit, that is to say, ways of making conscious its supreme interests, 
and each one of them makes it according to their particular nature5. In short, art represents 
for Hegel the “sensitive manifestation of the Idea (sinnliche Scheinen der Idee)”6. Certainly 
Hegel, in contrast to Kant, when making of art an expr ssion of the spirit, an spirit whose 
essence is the thought, he linked it to the knowledge and the truth, so that he perceived and 
underlined the philosophical relevance of aesthetics. And Heidegger, on the other hand, 
conceived that the essence of art is this: “The truth of beings setting itself to work (sich-ins-
Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit des Seienden)”, “the becoming and the happening of truth”, that 
is to say, of the being7. Definitely Hegel and Heidegger reaffirm the seriousness of art, its 
epistemological and ontological reach. Adorno also sustains -especially with Hegel- that 
art, far from being the place of the irrationality, it is rather a “complexion of the truth 
(Komplexion  der  Wahrheit)”8, and only for that reason he considers possible -andhe 
carries out according to the same title of his work- an ‘aesthetic theory’, a ‘theory’ 
(rational) on the aesthetic thing, what it would evid ntly be impossible if art were an 
irrational field.  The art thinks, as Adorno underlines, although –in fact- it thinks/judges 
“without words (wortlos)”; its thought, its logic is neither conceptual nor judicative9. So 
that art is not mere vital or emotional stimulant, it not only makes us to laugh or to cry, 
according to the journalistic-positivist topic that understands art from the point of view of 
the emotions: above all, art makes us think. Now then, to this the resemblance of the 
Adorno´s aesthetics is limited with those of Hegel and Heidegger. Starting from here, it is 
to see the peculiarity of the Adornian understanding of aesthetics opposite to those that 
Hegel and Heidegger expose. That peculiarity is beginning to take shape in the relationship 
between art and philosophy, a relationship that, in definite, is the one that underlies to all 
truly philosophical understanding of aesthetics. The status and the nature of aesthetics are 
in fact elucidated to the edge of the relationship between art and philosophy. Be it said 
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otherwise: all aesthetics contains like an essential feature a certain way to understand the 
relationship art-philosophy, and from now it comes off that it is the first thing that we 
should profile when we come closer to the aesthetics of any author. It represents the key 
that opens us the aesthetic building. 
Hegel and Heidegger save art, they legitimate its seriousness, they underline its 
epistemological and ontological competence. But their proposals outline some 
inconveniences, around which the Adorno´s aesthetic theory is drawn. Let us consider the 
Hegelian aesthetic program especially. Hegel esteems the art as much as less game and 
vital tonic, and the more knowledge and serious activity he believes that it is, paradoxically 
he considers it more inessential opposite to the philosophy, up to the point to finally 
dissolve it into philosophy, and to transform it ino “a past (ein Vergangenes)”10 –an 
operation that has been later denominated ‘death of art’. But this paradox stops being and 
becomes something of the most natural thing if we bear in mind that Hegel, far from 
defending the peculiarity of the artistic knowledge in contrast to the philosophical one, he 
measures art from the pattern of the philosophy already configured in model and goal of 
art. Hegel has so much put to bed art on the side of the philosophical knowledge –
conceptual-, and he has defended so little its specificity that the outcome could not be 
another than the overcoming of art through philosophy, of the intuition through concept.  
Certainly, when the purpose is to manifest ideas, that is to say, to express the spirit, that the 
spirit takes self-conscience -and this is the key point, the element that as we will see 
Adorno will in fact put in question starting from Hegel himself-, when this is the fact, art -
that will truly represent another thing - is in disadvantage regarding the philosophical 
concept, and this is so because the form of artistic expression is sensitive and not all 
spiritual content can be ‘sensitised’, so that the sensitive character of art forces it to be 
limited to manifest a certain stadium of the truth, of the self-conscience of the spirit.  What 
art does –a manifestation of the spirit, an expression of ideas- the philosophy -better, more 
appropriately- does too, the concept.  Apart from that sensitive understanding of the truth, 
Hegel affirms the existence of a deeper understanding of the truth, the one of the reflexive 
thought, the philosophical one, without any relationship already with the sensitive and that 
you can not express it sensibly in an appropriate way11.  Then, the art for Hegel can not 
longer be the “supreme and absolute form of expression of the spirit”, “the supreme form in 
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that the truth becomes existent”, the self-conscience of the spirit12. Art is finally overcome 
through thought and reflection. Art, then, turns to be something superfluous, unnecessary, 
being overcome by philosophy. Art, according to Hegel, dies for superfluity13.  From the 
moment philosophical that Hegel conceived the work of art more as symbol of an idea it 
was dictated its sentence of death. In definitive, H gel saves the epistemological relevance 
of art ‘philosophising’ about it, that is to say, transforming it into philosophy, in imitation 
of philosophical knowledge. The recovery of the epistemological value of art practiced by 
Hegel ends up in the most natural way in the statement that the aesthetics, the science of 
art, is worth more than the own art.  The Hegelian authentication of the seriousness of art 
through philosophy ends up costing to art its own life.  The case of Hegel teaches to 
Adorno – he teaches him to a modernized aesthetics- that the salvation of art can not be 
made without the own art, that is to say, the salvation has to come from the statement of the 
peculiarity of its non-discursive knowledge and it can not be imported from philosophy. 
The opposite to Hegel we find in Heidegger. If in Hegel the philosophy finally 
substituted art overcoming it, in Heidegger it is art which -using a term not completely 
appropriate- ‘overcomes’ the philosophy. In the Heideggerian thought, philosophy finishes 
constituting on the pattern of art. After the crisis of reason and of the scientific/rational 
culture, in sum, after the crisis of the metaphysical/humanist culture, philosophy does not 
find another possible way of survival -according to Heidegger- but to imitate art, already 
transformed into essential model of the philosophy14.  The rational or conceptual 
knowledge of philosophy is abandoned by the poetic knowledge of art previously 
dehumanised and conceived as the being’s word. Philosophy, conceptualizing thought, in 
opinion of Heidegger, is the “enemy of thinking”15, of the poetic thinking of art still hidden 
but that it will finish supplanting the objectifying thought of the concept.  In last term this 
is the reason of the Heideggerian sentence of aesthetics, since this consists on the -from the 
point of view of Heidegger- impossible desire of thinking art conceptually, a desire that 
represents one more form in the humanist/metaphysical way for him. Aesthetics is the 
humanist/metaphysical way of treating the phenomenon of art, that is to say, a 
humanization of a proper ontological phenomenon as art, that it is a poem written by the 
being; and the aesthetics of Hegel is its last and more accomplished exponent16. That is the 
way how Heidegger grants ontological and epistemological relevance -used this last term 
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with many reservations- to art, dehumanising it, separating it -better: antagonizing it- of 
philosophy understood as discursive knowledge. However, Adorno sustains in favour of the 
maintenance of the separation of spheres, that art is not -neither it can be, nor it should be- 
a “model of philosophy (philosophisches  Maβ)” 17. A philosophy that imitates the art –he 
adds – it eliminates itself because philosophy is conceptual, the concept is its organ18. 
Philosophy can not survive outside of the circles of the concept, its natural habitat. The 
case of Heidegger teaches to Adorno and in general to a contemporary aesthetics that it is 
not enough to affirm the peculiarity of the artistic knowledge in contrast to the conceptual 
one, what Heidegger does without doubt, but rather it is also necessary to avoid that the 
statement takes with itself the suppression of the discursive knowledge of philosophy. 
However, on purpose of the interpretation that Adorno does of Heidegger it is 
necessary to think rationally about the doubt of if that supposed elimination of the 
philosophy that Heidegger would practice when forcing t to imitate the art, would not 
rather respond to the project of achieving a new philosophy, a ‘poetic’ philosophy that 
would not really be mounted on the annihilation of the rational thinking –a thesis of base of 
Adorno-, but rather on its replacement or rooting form in its original womb, the logos 
mitopoiético. Only the pattern of rationality ‘modern’ and the philosophy and the technique 
that accompany it, that have forgotten their poiético origin, that is to say, that they have 
forgotten that they are functions of the al théia, of the revealing of the truth/being, they are 
only the enemies of thinking. Then it is not to suppress them, but of returning them to their 
original source. The Heideggerian proposal would suppose the suppression of the division 
between art and philosophy, and its result would be the poetic thinking, a thinking where 
reason and poetry would reach a peaceful coexistence, and where the romantic ideal of the 
intellectual intuition would take body again. This interpretation of Heidegger nevertheless 
would collide again head-on with the position of Adorno, for whom the separation between 
art and philosophy -something irrevertible- bases on the same structure of the conscience, 
divided in two different and irreducible dimensions:  a mimetic/expressive, ‘artistic’ one, 
and another conceptual one, ‘philosophical’.  From there that Adorno underrates in 
principle any philosophical project that is sustained about the hope of finding in the 
conscience hidden sources that liberate us of the objectifying or conceptualizing thinking 
which is prevailing up to now, and that they open the possibility of a new and different 
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thinking for us19.  Definitively, -and always from the perspective pro osed by Adorno-, 
Hegel overvalued the rational or conceptual knowledge in detriment of the epistemological 
particularity of art; Heidegger does the same thing with the poetic knowledge in detriment 
of the philosophical/discursive one.  What both, Hegel and Heidegger, teach to aesthetics is 
that this has to be mounted on the base of the avoid nce of the confusion of spheres among 
art and philosophy, of the reduction or absorption of one for another. This is the direction 
that Adorno follows. Therefore, and in summary, the elements of departure of the Adornian 
foundation of aesthetics are the following.  First, art has epistemological relevance, it is a 
knowledge linked to the truth; second, it is a peculiar knowledge, not discursive; and in 
third place, that knowledge exists beside the philosophical knowledge. In fact, the 
determination on the part of Adorno of the status of aesthetics is forged on the explanation 
of this last element, the relationship among art and philosophy, true touchstone of the 
nature of aesthetics. 
 
2. Art,  Dialectics  and  Identity 
Adorno finds in the Hegelian aesthetic the central piece around which aesthetics is 
as much profiled, the understanding of the relationship between art and philosophy, as the 
own philosophy. Hegel has understood the essence (dial ctical) of the aesthetic thing, but 
far from developing it and from displaying his aesthetics and his philosophy all in 
agreement with it, he has drowned it and betrayed it with another philosophical impulse of 
a contrary nature (the principle of identity), leaving it as something onty initiated, a 
tendency, that certainly Adorno recovers and that he takes as central element of his 
aesthetic/philosophic thought20. From there the importance of deepening in the Hegelian 
aesthetic theory, main referent of the perspective of Adorno. The phenomenology of art 
that Hegel practiced, and that it had served him as base to develop a truly dialectical 
thought, it was subjected at the philosophical principle of the identity, and so what 
miscarried that dialectical possibility denaturalising it in a positive dialectics, being 
founded on the principle of identity, just the opposite to the dialectical thing. A dialectics 
founded about the identity is not dialectical. Indee , Hegel has conceived art, the same 
thing as religion or philosophy, above all, like forms of the conscience, like positions of the 
subject/thought before the object/reality (Stellungen des Gedankens zur Objektivität)20.  
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Adorno will later insist on the same thing, he will say that “the aesthetics is not a theory of 
art, but, in words of Hegel, a certain position of the thought before objectivity”22. In short, 
the “aesthetic moment of the conscience” consists according to Hegel on the alienation [of 
the spirit] toward the sensible thing (Entfremdung zum Sinnlichen)23. The art is born of the 
spirit and it is of spiritual nature, but in the work of art the spirit reaches the non spiritual 
thing, the sensible/material thing. If we bear in mind that Hegel affirms that the essence of 
the spirit is the thought, we can assure that in the aesthetic experience the thought thinks 
what is not thought, the thing itself, the reality other. The aesthetic experience is 
dialectical, in it the spirit comes out of itself and finds its other one, it penetrates in the 
matter. 
Adorno will also echo that dialectics, therefore, does not represent a method to 
come closer to art but something that is immanent for it24. What is immanent to art, 
therefore, dialectics, it is but the statement of the permanent tension among fellow and 
object, spirit and matter, thought and real thing, irreducible one to other, but also 
inseparable, existing in constant reciprocal reference. Neither dualism nor absorption or 
identification: dialectics.  However, the dialectics as long as opposed principle to the pure 
static duality -that does not arrive to the other thing - and to the identity -that does not leave 
from itself-, and as statement of the other thing, t is what allows philosophy to truly be 
philosophy, that is, thought of the concrete thing, of the thing itself, phenomenology. Here 
it is pointed the philosophical transcendency of the aesthetics discovered by Adorno: 
aesthetics is the characteristic field of the dialecticity. On the other hand, if we start from 
considering that art is already spiritual activity in its origin, what Adorno finds as essential 
nucleus -dialectical- of the Hegelian aesthetic it is hat it affirms -at least in a tendency 
form- that “the art is a cell of materialism”25, that is to say, principle of statement -
salvation- of the other, of the non spiritual thing.  Therefore, in art the spirit exists in 
permanent excursion toward what is not itself.  Adorno has referred to this dialectical 
activity that characterizes art under the name of ‘mimesis’: “The spiritual moment of the art 
is not what idealism calls spirit, Adorno has written, but rather the proscribed mimetic 
impulse (mimetische  Impuls)”26. This is the way art ‘thinks’, mimetically or immediately, 
and not by  means  of the concept. It does not think using words but with mimesis, without 
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mediations. For this reason Adorno sustains that the “linguistic moment (Sprachähnliche  
Moment)” of art is its “mimetic moment (Mimetisches)”27. 
However, the idealistic Hegel does not assume but rathe  he denies this 
mimetic/dialectical character of the spirit, and with it he suspends the dialectical possibility 
for the philosophy discovered by himself in the aesth tic experience. In the philosophy of 
Hegel it weighs more the imperative of identity than the dialectical principle. Hegel has 
recognized, moved by a phenomenological impulse that the characteristic of the aesthetic 
experience consists in that in it the spirit reaches and penetrates in the other, in what is not 
spirit.  But this dialectical moment of aesthetics -centre of interest for Adorno- is 
disconnected by Hegel himself when sustaining that “t e power of the thinking spirit is in 
that, it is not only captured itself in its peculiar form as thought, but rather it is also 
recognized to itself in its exteriorisation by means of the sensation and the sensibility, it is 
understood in the other thing of itself, as soon as turned into thought the alienated thing and 
with which it leads again to itself”28. Hegel annuls dialectics in which the spirit (subject, 
thought) recognized the other sensible/material thing (object, reality) to exist in constant 
and irreducible tension, and he transmutes dialectics in identity: “The subject-object of 
Hegel, Adorno affirms, is a subject”29.  The own Hegel sustains -against the dialectical 
nature in principle hinted- the identity of the spiritual and sensitive moments of art30. The 
alienation is only a moment overcome by the impulse of self-acknowledgement 
characteristic of the spirit, for Versöhnung. The spirit that Adorno has discovered in the art, 
the spirit in general, is mimesis, alienation, dialectics; the Hegelian spirit, on the other 
hand, is self-conscience. But to say that in Hegel the spirit is self-conscience is equal to say 
that it tends to be recognized itself in the seemingly other thing, annihilating the 
strangeness of the world with respect to it, which reveals in last term like only appearance. 
The world is not essentially strange for the spirit; the final relationship between the spirit 
and the world is not of strangeness but of familiarity. The Hegelian spirit feels everywhere 
like at home. The Hegelian statement of the spirit like self-conscience is a correlate of its 
philosophy of the identity. However, Adorno has written that the identity “devours 
everything (alles Verschlingende)”, “it always looks for the totality”31. And so Hegel 
overcomes  the injustices to which it seems to be subjected the world of the concrete 
reality, the whole blood spilled for the long-suffering individual reality.  Elaborated from 
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the point of view of the spirit whose nature is theought, the reason, transformed now into 
substance of the real thing, the philosophy, Hegel writes, “it remedies the apparent injustice 
(das  Unrecht  scheint) and reconciles (versöhnt) it with the rational thing”32. The rational 
spirit, that legitimates all the real thing when understanding it like an external reality of 
itself, does not deny -logically- the pain nor the blood; what it denies is that they are unjust. 
They will be able to be from the individual's point of view, but not certainly understood in 
big, sub  specie  aeternitatis. Be it said otherwise, from the point of view of the reason -no 
of the understanding- everything is like it should be, the real thing (wirklich) and the 
rational thing (vernünftig) are only one thing33. 
In a first moment, the one that interests to Adorno, the Hegelian aesthetic is 
phenomenological: open to art, liberated to the aesthetic experience, it discovers the 
alienation, the dialectics that constitutes it essentially. But then it turns its back on this 
artistic peculiarity, it stops to meditate assisting to the own aesthetic experience, and it 
finds in it what it has already established a  priori, in a purely conceptual way: that the 
aesthetic experience is pure manifestation of the spirit, so that in it the spirit does not really 
reach the other thing, it does not alienate, but rather it recognizes itself in the other thing, it 
alienates for self-recognising. It is the systematic moment of the Hegelian aesthetics, the 
one that finishes determining it. For this reason it can be said that the aesthetics of Hegel is 
made from outside of the own art, without meditating about the same aesthetic experience, 
turned its back on the dialectical specificity that this last one represents, to the alienation of 
the spirit toward the other that happens in it, andit is so in spite of ‘having seen it’. Such is 
the force of the imperative of Hegelian identity. Logically, if what is about in art is of 
symbolizing ideas, that is to say, that the spirit is o be recognized itself and not to be 
alienated, and philosophy does it in a more appropriate way, then Hegel can consider with 
all property the question ‘for what art’. The crash of the dialectical peculiarity of the art 
before the principle of identity transforms art into something superfluous.  After the death -
or superseding- of the art it is found the philosophy of the identity. 
What Adorno underlines is that Hegel himself, in the dialectical essence of the 
aesthetics, had discovered the antidote against thi p ilosophy of the identity that 
legitimated the wounds of the concrete reality healing them up in false. In the work of art 
the spirit is mimesis. In the logic of the work of art there is only spirit when “it is subjected 
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to what is polarly opposite to it”34. This mimetic/dialectical spirit, instead of overcoming 
the other, its opposing one, the pain of the reality that screams in silence, being recognized 
in it as its truth, it is undergone to that silent reality to give him the word. It only, only this 
spiritual mimesis, prevents the false Hegelian reconciliation of the real pain that transmutes 
it by means of the magic of the philosophy of the id ntity in rational justice; it only 
prevents the dissolution of the blood that does not cease flowing of the individual in ideal 
intelligibility. And it is necessary that we experince that the alive individual really 
continues bleeding and suffering, because this alive conscience is the only hope that we 
have left in the universe of the totalising identity. Without that conscience, the pain –real- 
will be buried.  But this movement is the one that the idealism began, especially the 
Hegelian philosophy: to transform the pain into concept, to identify it, as Adorno sustains, 
it supposes to leave it silent and sterile. In front f this legitimization of the pain 
characteristic of the philosophy of the identity by means of the silence and the oblivion, 
Adorno finds in the mimetic/dialectical spirit of art the opportunity to give it the word. Art, 
he writes, it is the “language of the suffering (Sprache  des  Leidens)”,  “unconscious 
writing of the history (bewuβtlose  Geschichtsschreibung)”35. That mimesis is the condition 
of possibility of a negative dialectics. To be the voice of the pain is what, in opinion of 
Adorno, also explains the inintelligibility of art, i s enigmatic character (Rätselcharakter)36. 
If the work of art could be fully understood and translated to concepts, it would be also the 
concrete reality that designates, but this is in fact what philosophy of the identity does to 
exorcize the negativity of such reality. The work of art completes its dialectical function 
giving the word to the real pain in all its negative power, indissoluble to all interpretation. 
 
3.  The  Convergence  of  Art  and  Philosophy 
The aesthetics of Hegel is philosophical and not mere theory of art, as the aesthetic 
theory of Adorno; but it does not coincide with it in that it is in the systematic sense, that is, 
in the sense that it is an aesthetics made from above or from outside of the properly 
aesthetic thing, from an established philosophy a priori. It then starts from a previous and 
independent philosophy of the aesthetic thing, that of the identity. The Hegelian aesthetics 
is philosophical because it is philosophy applied to art. However, it is so in the price of 
extirpating the specificity of the artistic -the dialectics, the alienation of the spirit toward 
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the another- applying from outside, imposing to it a philosophy that is strange for it.  The 
philosophy enters it this way, legislating from its pre-aesthetic categories the truth of art. 
The aesthetics of Hegel is not but applied philosophy, a philosophy pre-aesthetics, 
elaborated to the margin of the aesthetic thing, the p ilosophy of the identity. From it the 
art is interpreted and, when making it, it prevents the unfolding of the nature of the 
aesthetic thing, that Hegel himself had suggested. The Hegelian aesthetics gives up before 
the philosophical imperative of the identity and surrenders to it, abolishing the imperative 
properly aesthetic, that was of contrary sign, that is o say, of dialectical character and 
anything identical. The opposition of Adorno to this idealistic understanding of the 
aesthetics can not be more radical: “The aesthetics is not applied philosophy (angewandte  
Philosophie) but rather it is philosophical in itself (philosophisch  an  sich)”37. Instead of 
applying it a philosophy of contrary sign, the philosophy of the identity, Adorno finds in 
the aesthetic thing the base of the philosophical thing, the dialectics. Adorno incorporates 
the philosophical thing -the dialectics- to the aesth tic thing; the philosophy (dialectical) is 
immanent to the aesthetic experience38. In fact, only because in the aesthetic thing he 
discovers the philosophical one, only for this reason, it can be the aesthetics, the aesthetic 
theory, philosophical in itself. The aesthetics is not philosophical because it is applied to it 
a certain philosophy; it is philosophical because th  topic of the aesthetics, the aesthetic 
thing, that is to say, the dialectical position of the thought in the face of the objectivity, is 
philosophical. The aesthetics of Adorno, far from being carried out from outside of the art 
by virtue of a strange philosophy applied to art, it is directed by the phenomenological 
principle of attention to the artistic phenomenon. It is not philosophy applied to the art, it is 
not an aesthetics from outside or from above, it is not then an aesthetic theory in abstract; it 
abides by the historical phenomenon of art, to the current reality of art. 
Adorno has denied the possibility that the aesthetic object is known -legislated- 
from outside and demands “an understanding of the works of art that is a strictly 
determinated knowledge for the objectivity of themslves”39. The aesthetic theory is not, it 
can not be, a philosophical construction a  priori; the experience of the aesthetic object is 
its stage40. But it is not mere theory (positive) of the art eith r. What Adorno also denies is 
the possibility that the work of art has to “be understood purely from itself like object of 
immediate intuition”41. Art is not certainly understood from a philosophy already done, in a 
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Hege1ian way; but it can not only be understood from itself either. The work of art, he 
adds, “demands something more than abandon oneself to it”42. A reflection that “is limited 
to the art, he writes, it does not guess right with it: its internal composition requires of what 
is not art”43. It claims the philosophy. Therefore, Adorno concludes, the aesthetics can not 
be behind regarding the art [that is what defines to the Hegelian aesthetics], but not 
regarding the philosophy either44. However, the philosophy for Adorno does not intervene 
in art nor to the Hegelian idealistic way, from outside, legislating the truth of the artistic 
thing, and as in Heidegger either, where the philosophy imitates to the art: it is self-
eliminated as conceptual thought and it becomes poetic thinking. Hegel and Heidegger 
have understood philosophically the art in exchange of absorbing or reducing one to the 
other, that is to say, in exchange for sacrificing the peculiarity of one of the spheres to the 
other one. In front of both, Adorno defends the irrversibility of the separation among art 
and philosophy, or what is the same thing, it defends the irreducible peculiarity of art and 
of philosophy.  Neither the philosophy overcomes art because this decreases to that one 
(Hegel), nor the art becomes model of the philosophy (Heidegger). But the maintenance of 
the difference among the philosophical and artistic pheres does not mean for Adorno to 
deny the existence of relationships among them. All the contrary.  Art and philosophy are 
different, but in permanent relationship, in constat tension. An appropriate philosophical 
understanding of art according to Adorno can consist neither in its reduction to philosophy 
nor in its elevation to pattern of the philosophy, it is only possible on the base of 
incorporating the philosophical thing in art. 
The discovery of the philosophical thing in art does not only prevents that 
relationship of tension between art and philosophy, of continuous reciprocal reference, but 
rather it is what makes it possible. The incorporati n of the philosophical thing in the 
aesthetic thing forces art and philosophy to converge, to be needed mutually. The 
convergence among art and philosophy that Adorno sustains responds to the same 
dialectics that impregnates all its thought: art and philosophy maintain the same dialectical 
relationship that subject and object, or thought and reality, they are different but 
inseparable, as the Dióscuros Cástor and Pó1ux. Let us analyse this convergence. In the 
first place it will be necessary to clarify in what sense we are affirming that Adorno 
incorporates the philosophical thing in art. The philosophy discovered in art is not logically 
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a philosophy already done; art is not philosophy, it is not symbol of an idea, as Hegel 
sustained, a reason for what could be finally supplanted by the philosophy itself. Art is 
rather a demand of philosophy; the philosophy that is discovered in art is a demand, a 
demand of reflection, a truth thought not discursively, and that philosophy will have to 
perform developing it conceptually. In art, as long as it is dialectics, mimesis, there is an 
immediate presence of the things, there is truth. The alienation of the spirit that takes place 
in art allows it once a leap, without mediations, to install in the things in their truth. Adorno 
suggests us that art is a proximity experience to the things, perhaps the highest experience 
of vicinity that we can have with regards to them, and that contrasts with the distance that 
establishes the philosophical experience -conceptua1- between us and things. The 
proximity that characterizes to the aesthetic experience has a price. The art thinks, it judges, 
but it does it without words, not discursively, Adorn  has sustained, but it is precisely for it 
that it also has to be thought. It has the truth, but as something incommensurable with 
itself; it has the truth, but in an immediate way, t a rough guess and for that reason it 
escapes from art, it gets dark45. That is the ‘philosophy’ which exists in art. For that reason, 
he writes, “the art is hoping to be explained”46, that is to say, it is hoping its thought to be 
thought conceptually. With the result that Adorno affirms that “the genuine aesthetic 
experience has to become philosophy or it is absolutely nothing”47. For this same reason 
aesthetics is philosophical in itself. Art demands philosophy, it needs of the discursive 
reflection. 
But also, secondly, philosophy, the conceptual speech, needs of art. Adorno 
understands philosophy as dialectics, as thought of the concrete, that is, true 
phenomeno1ogy. Only as dialectics -what is equal to the rupture of the imposition of the 
identity- it is possible phenomeno1ogy. Besides, the p ilosophy according to Adorno can 
only be verified as such phenomenology/dialectics by means of the concept. Indeed, the 
concept is the organ of philosophy, but Adorno also recognizes that it is a wall that makes 
impossible his dialectical intellectual project because the concept itself distances the 
thought from that which it thinks48. This is the paradox in which the philosophy moves: its 
natural environment, the concept, it is the same onthat prevents it to be what it is, 
phenomenology. Adorno has been liberated of the “idal stic illusion”, that is to say, of the 
“belief in that it is possible to grasp (ergreifen) the entirety of the real thing for the force of 
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the thought”, so that his philosophy is defined by the “conscience of the non-identity” 
between the thought and the thing, philosophy that in virtue of this critic conscience of the 
idealistic illusion is denominated by Adorno as e sayistic49. The essay is not then a mere 
form of philosophy, but rather the current form of philosophy, that is to say, the form of a 
philosophy that -convinced that the “objects are more than their concepts”50- it lives in the 
conscience of the non-identity between thought and reality, what above all supposes to 
affirm that philosophy just as Adorno understands it –as essay- it is to think the other thing, 
what is not to think, concept, but –in fact- with the concept. However, this same concept 
makes impossible to think the other or concrete, what is not thought. To think 
(conceptually) it is to identify, so that the concepts -when thinking- they can not say but 
what they put themselves. Philosophy thinks by means of concepts, but these concepts 
themselves are those that separate it of what it thinks. This is the distance in what the 
philosophy moves, and the cause of the distance regarding the things that we experience in 
it. Philosophy, discursive knowledge, lacks appearance of the things, it lacks truth. 
Certainly, in exchange for it, it gives us clarity and distinction, rigor and precision, but it 
lacks the truth, the proximity of the things. It reveals the truth, it has the appropriate 
conceptual mediation for revealing it, but it has not the truth51. 
The understanding of the concept like wall that disances is equal to the crash of 
the idealistic dream, but Adorno does not deduce from there the rejection of the discursive 
knowledge and the opening for the philosophy of another road of knowledge: “Only 
concepts can carry out what the concepts prevent”52. The concept is the organ of the 
philosophy. Adorno does not reject the concept but rather he corrects it and enlarges it with 
the incorporation of another element, the dialectical mimesis of the aesthetic thing. Adorno 
affirms the philosophy like will of telling conceptually what is not concept, “what is not 
properly possible to say by means of it”, so that in philosophy the concepts have to stop to 
only be just them to go to their other one and to think about it, they have to penetrate in 
what is not conceptual without absorbing it, without identifying it with themselves, without 
accommodating that which is not conceptual to the concepts53. Concepts have to be 
alienated, but this excursion toward the other thing is the characteristic dialectics of art. 
Therefore, so that the philosophy, the conceptual thinking, can overcome its natural 
idealistic tendency -identifier- and can think the other thing, the concrete thing; in sum, so 
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that the philosophy can be at the height of what is heterogeneous for it -as it is 
characteristic to the dialectical/philosophical thinking-, the concept has to incorporate in its 
own behaviour -without stopping to be concept- the activity characteristic of art, the 
alienation, the excursion toward the other thing, the mimesis. This is the one that 
contributes to philosophy the presence, the truth. P ilosophy has to appropriate in its 
behaviour of the aesthetic alienation, but being philosophy, conceptual/reflexive thought. 
What it is treated, Adorno notes down, it is of “saving the mimesis in the means of the 
concept”54. Philosophy can only be carried out as phenomenology -dialectics- by means of 
the artistic mimesis. Without mimesis there is not dialectics. The concept supplanted the 
mimesis; now it has to reproduce that mimetic conduct in its own behaviour. Those two 
sides different from the conscience converge this way. Art needs the philosophical 
reflection to deploy its truth, the truth that reaches in its mimesis but in dark, 
incommensurable way; philosophy needs of the artistic mimesis to correct the identifying 
tyranny of the philosophical reason, to overcome its idealistic limit and to be able to think 
the things, the other thing of the thought, the truth. The immediacy of the aesthetic 
proximity needs the conceptual distance of the philosophy to be able to think what it has so 
next that it cannot think it; the conceptual mediation of the philosophical distance needs the 
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